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It is not inappropriate to understand the modern and postmodern periods in
the West as representing two moments of intellectual revolution. The modern
era was spawned by an intellectual revolution that upset the assumptions of
medieval philosophy just as postrnodernism in the contemporary period is
founded on an intellectual outlook that challenges the assumptions of modern
categories.' In this sense, both periods correspond to sigmficant paradigm
shifts in Western intellectual traditi~n.~
By the nature of the case, theological
reflection as an intellectual activity in each period is correspondingly impacted,
thus malung it possible to distinguish a characteristically modern theology from
contemporary theology.
In each of these periodic shifts, the question of epistemology comes to
center stage,although, as should be expected, an epistemological change signals
a corresponding ontological adj~stment.~
From a theological perspective, the
paradigmatic shift during the modern period was from the view that has been
characterized as extrinsicism, to the developing school of histori~ism.~
Epistemologically, extrinsicism stressed the place of &vine revelation as the
sole source of truth that owed nothing to history, except for the fact that it was
given to the believers once and for all at a given point in history. Of course, ths
view did not preclude internal development through systematization to ensure
clarity.5On the other hand, hstoricism reduced the realm of truth to hstory,
maintaining, "all truth, includmg that of the Christian faith, must submit to the
judgment of hi~tory."~
In so doing, historicism was claiming the right to treat
Christian doctrine as a matter of pure history and thereby subject it to critical
'Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer On Postmodemism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 84; see also
Peter C. Hodges and Robert H. King, eds., Christian T b e o h ~(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989), 10.

'1 mean by the termparadigm what Thomas S. Kuhn understood as "an entire constellation
of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community" (The
Structure ofScient$c Revohtions [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19701, 175).
'Fernando L. Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timehssness as Primrdial
Presqpositions (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1983), 34ff. My concern in this paper,
however, has to do with issues of an epistemological nature.
4See William A. Scott, "The Notion of Tradition in Maurice Blondel," TbeologicalStudies 27
(1966): 384-385.

study with the canons of reason. This was the modernist position. Thus was
introduced the distinction between faith as assent to doctrine and history as the
realm of reason and facts.
On the other hand, the contemporary paradigmatic shft is from
modernism to postmodernism. In this instance, the modern concept of
rationality, with its stress on autonomous reason and objectivity in the search
for an overarching truth, has come under attack. Modemism sought to explain
and provide meaning to all reality on the foundation of reason. In other words,
the world was what reason thought it to be, and this was to be taken as
universally true for all time. Over against modem rationality, postmodernism
claims that the very idea of a belief system that is always and universally true is
no longer credible. It is argued that the very fact of our situatedness in
particular historical contexts forces us to experience the world through our
individual and unique perspectives, such that the postmodern outlook
"demands an attack on any claim to universality."'
Theologically, it is assumed that modernist assumptions of rationality have
permeated evangelical thought since roughly 1850 to 1950.' Thus, conservative
evangelicalism is, philosophically, said to be reflective of certain aspects of
modem epistemology. On the other hand, the postmodernist influence in
contemporary theology is seen in the various calls for revisioning evangelical
theology9 to reflect contemporary postmodem epistemological concerns.
The situation in whch theology finds itself in each paradgrn change leads
to the stress of extreme positions that moderate voices find necessary to
mediate and synthesize. This has been the case in both the
extrinsicism/historicism dialectic of the modem period and the
modern/postmodem confrontation of the contemporary era. In both cases, a
specific concept has been called into service to mediate the competing
viewpoints. The concept that has conveniently been called upon to play this
irenic function is the notion of tradition, which in the process has undergone
This observation calls for a carefJ look at the concept of
some re~ision.'~
tradition. What is this apparently malleable concept (or concepts) of tradition
that makes it amenable to facilitate dialogue between competing epistemological
'See John G. Stackhouse, ed., Evange/ica/Fntuns(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 32. Donald
Bloesch, for instance, has argued that modernist and rationalistic tendencies are discernible in the
writings of such evangelical giants as Carl F. Henry,John Warwick Montgomery, Francis Schaeffer,
and Norman Geisler (EssentialroJEvangelica/Theolbgv [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979],2:267268.
'See, for example, Stanley J. Grenz, Revisioning Euangekca/ Tkolbg: A Fnsh Agenahfor the Zlst
Centuty (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1993); and David Brown, Traditionand Imagination (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999).
"For a concise but helpful overview of the evolution of the concept of tradition, see David
F. Wells, "Tradition: A Meeting Place for Catholic and Evangelical Theology," CbriJian Schobrs
Ren'ew 5 (1975): 50-61. In this article, Wells notes how positions have changed regarding the
concept of tradition and are, therefore, an encouragement toward a new dialogue between
Catholics and evangelicals.

options? What implications does the evolving concept of tradition have for
theologcal method, and how should these be assessed?This article will address
these issues.
The approach adopted here dexamine specific theological proposals that
have been made regarding the understanding of the concept of tradition that
is deemed essential for mediating between apparently irreconcilable
epistemologicalpositions. These proposals will be examined with the specific
objective of underscoring the nature of the particular concept of tradition that
its promulgators espouse. Subsequently, the possible implications that these
concepts of tradttion may have for theological method wdl be explored. Before
I look at the revisions to the concepts of tradition proposed in the modern and
postmodern periods, however, it may be worth reviewing briefly the concept
from the early church until the modern period.

Tradition: From the Ear4 Chzirch to the Modem Period
It seems accurate to observe that during the period under review tradttion was
generally understood in an objective sense, although such characterization runs
the risk of obscuring significant variations in meaning attached to the concept.
The early patristic period maintained a clear distinction between apostolic
paradosir (tradition) considered authoritative because of its divine origin, and the
church's didaskaka (teaching), which was not authoritative, although it was not
long before apostolic legends, liturgical practices, and generally accepted
interpretations of biblical texts came to be classed under the category of
paradosis." The movement toward the equal valuation of apostolicparadosis and
church &daskaka would be gven a significant boost with Vincent de Lerins's
publication of his Commonitoria, an event which strengthened the hand of the
church in its responsibility, even obligation, in defuling the truth." The
medieval contribution to this process was the handing over of apostolic
authority to the church, as a result of which tradition came to be identified with
the functioning of the church.13Nevertheless, the Council of Trent became a
sipficant defuling moment for the relationship between Scripture and
tradtion. The Council succeeded in bnnging near harmony to three competing
"Ibid., 51; see also Josef Rupert Geiselmann, The Meaning ufTradition (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1966), 17. Geiselmann distinguishes the transmission of the paradoif to the church
(including the committing to writing) by divine action from the testimony of ecclesiastical tradition,
which is a human action, albeit with the Holy Spirit's assistance. Nevertheless as a testimony to the
already developing elevation ?f ecclesiastical practices to the level of apostolic paradoi~,Avery
Dulles, for example, notes that Fathers such as Basil could write that "among the doctrines and the
definitions preserved in the Church, we hold some on the basis of written teaching and others we
have received, transmitted secretly, from apostolic tradition. All are of equal value for piety"
("Tradition and Creativity: A Theological Approach," in The Qaadtihg, ed. Kenneth Hagen
[Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 19941, 313). Still, Dulles, ibid., concludes that "until the late
Middle Ages the dominant tendency was to treat Scripture as the basic text of revelation and to rely
on tradition, especially patristic tradition, for the authoritative interpretation of Scripture."
'wells, 51.
"Ibid.

schools of thought on the relationship between Scripture and tradition when
"it was almost unanimously agreed that the canonical Scriptures are not
sufficient as a source of d~ctrine."'~
Avery Dulles notes at least three different ways in which the concept of
tradition has been nuanced since the Council of Trent: objectively to mean
"revealed truths handed down from apostolic times by channels other than
canonical Scriptures"; "to designate the process of transmitting the apostolic
heritage," both scriptural or otherwise; and as "a criterion . . . to establish the
authenticity of certain doctrines and practice^."'^ It is quite evident that in all
these variations, as in the rest of the period under consideration, there was a
bent to see tradition in an objective sense; a body of doctrine, objectively
identifiable and requiring to be preserved. The situation will be significantly
different in the nineteenth century, whch d l mark the first major epistemic
divide, and hence call for a radical nuancing of the concept of tradition. To this
episternic divide I now turn my attention.

Tradition: Between Pnmodem Exttlnsicism and Modem Historicism
The objectivist understandingof the concept of tradition from the early church
up to the modem period entailed a particular epistemological outlook.
Extrinsicism, as this essentially theologxal epistemological view has been called,
structured the relation between revelation and hstory in clearly defined and
unequivocal terms. Knowledge from revelation, accordmg to this view, is
supernatural and extrinsic to man and the hstorical process. It is distinct from
historical knowledge both in its source and its essential nature.
The Enlightenmentof the seventeenth century, which ultimatelygave birth
to the modern period, created several difficulties for the epistemology that
underlay extrinsicism.Among the powerful forces that were unleashed by the
Enlightenment and that would eventually undermine the epistemological
assumptions of extrinsicism,three have been noted. The widespread acceptance
of the developing scientific worldview, philosophy's turn to the knowing
subject, and the development of a new historical consciousness gave the
'~
was a natural
modem period a new epistemological o ~ t l o o k . Historicism
development from the emerging intellectual milieu. Gotthold Lessing's "ugly
broad d~tch"was a pithy expression, during the eighteenth century, of the
intellectual concerns of the school of historicism." As noted earlier on,
"Avery Dulles, The Crt$ ofTheohg (New York: Crossroads, 1992), 88.
15Dulles,"Tradition and Creativity," 314.
16SeeRobert H. King, "The Task of Christian Theology," in Christian Theology, ed. Peter C.
Hodgson and Robert H. King (Philadelphia: Fortress, l989), 10-12. The Kan tian Copernican
revolution, although epistemological at heart, together with David Hume's philosophical program,
"attacked the metaphysical assumptions which undergirded . . . the classic doctrine of revelation,"
thus challenging the whole edifice of extrinsicism (ibid., 124).
17Lessingtypically reflected the historicist view when he maintained that the accidental truths
of history can never become the proof of the necessary truths of reason.

historicism saw history as the only truth, thus insisting, "all truth, including that
of the Christian faith, must submit to the judgment of history."'8
In the context of this extrinsicism/historicism dialectic, Maurice Blonde1
attempted, via the concept of tradition, to forge a nexus between the two
apparently contradictory viewpoints. It was Blondel's goal to show that the
values in both extrinsicism and historicism can be brought to subsist and serve
the tradition of the church.
Tradttion: Blondel's via Mela'"
It is central to Blondel's concept of traltion that tradition may furnish things
that cannot be translated into language and that may not be imrneQately and
integrally convertible into an intellectualexpre~sion.~~
Contrary to what appears
to have been the early church's position, tradition in Blondel's view "is not a
transmission,principally oral, of historical facts, of truths received, of teachings
communicated, of consecrated practices and of ancient customs";21 rather,
tradition "is a preserving power . . . ;it discovers and formulates truths whch
the past lived, without being able to articulate them or define them explicitly;
it enriches the intellectual patrimony by minting little by little the total deposit
and by making it
By redefining traltion as a formative process, Blonde1made room for the
influence of research, science, phlosophy, and other human, hrstorical means
in the traltion-forming process without necessarily subjugating tradition to
these means.23But underlying Blondel's notion of tradttion as a "preserving
power" is his phdosophy of action, accordmg to which truth unfolds in a
constant process of action, reflection, and reaction.24Tradition, therefore,
'Scott, 385.

'% series of articles by Maurice Blondel on the subject of tradition between 1904 and 1905
have been reprinted in Les Premiers E m i ~de Maurice Blonde/ Scott's "The Notion of Tradition in
Maurice Blondel" provides a concise overview of Blondel's thought on the subject that will be
relied on in this section of my discussion.
"See Scott, 386.
"Cited in Scott, 386.
"Ibid., 387. I should point out that the departure from the early church's objectivist position
on tradition did not begin with Blondel. Already in the first quarter of the nineteenth century,
Johann Adam Mohler had depicted tradition as a mysterious inner principle or power of spiritual
life (Dulles, "Tradition and Creativity," 31 4).
"Scott, 389-390. Preserving for the church a principal role in the tradition-forming process,
Blonde1 writes: "She speaks with an authority independent of all grounds of judgment; but she
addresses herself to intehgence as much as to docility, asserting the right of reason because she
wishes to teach a communicable truth. She does not have to take account of human contingencies
and she does not preoccupy herself with being clever, opportune, adapted; but she uses all human
means to be understood, and to find in men the points of insertion prepared for her action.
Everywhere her supernatural wisdom bghts itself with lights, surrounds itself with precautions,
determines itself with natural operations" (ibid.).
241bid.,392. In his philosophy of action, Blondel sets up an indissoluble relation between

which in Blondel's view is the life, the action of the church, forms itself by the
use of a methodology of action. But this is not all born of natural, existential
phenomena, because, according to him, the traditioning process occurs under
the active direction of Christ.
It is evident that through his philosophy of action Blonde1 attempts to
bridge the divide between the extrinsicist and historicist views. We must note,
however, the important points in the process of this transaction. First, the
notion of tradition is invested with a new meaning, namely, the church living
her life, as opposed to a deposit of truth to be guarded. Next, Blonde1 appears
to adopt some theological presuppositions in his understanding of tradition.
Without denying the committal of divine truth to the church, Blonde1 sees the
need for the historical development and unfolding of this truth. As Scott
correctly points out, it is germane to Blondel's view that not only d ~ Chnst
d
not
commit total truth to the church, but "the deposit of truth which He wanted
to commit to the Church could not be given to it under a completely
intellectual form."25 Epistemologically, Blonde1 presupposes an insufficient
original revelation, while his ontological presuppositions lead him to the
conclusions that the divine truth could not be contained in any one set of
human formulations, and that there cannot be a time in history when the mind
of man can exhaust the divine mind.26
In more recent times the influence of Blondel's views on tradition,
especially within the Roman Catholic Church, has been discernible in the
Tiibingen theologian Josef Rupert and the French Dominican Yves Congar.
Through the contribution of these theologians, Vatican I1 received the stamp
of Blondel's dynamic concept of tradition."
Among Protestant theologians, Thomas C. Oden's concept of tradition
would seem to come closest to the modern Catholic understandingof tradition
adopted at Vatican II.28
thought and concrete action out of which truth unfolds. It has been correctly observed that
Blondel's philosophy of action has "nothing to do with those who conceive of philosophy as some
sort of inviolate realm of pure thought not to be stained by the concrete loves, hatreds, fears,
failures, and aspirations of the living human being as he works out in history and in himself the
destiny of the human race. For while human nature is the same, it is existentially ever changmg, and
so essence must always be discussed in the real world on all levels, theological, historical,
biophysical, and not merely on the metaphysical. The philosopher, then, must join hands with the
mystic and the saint, with the artist, the scientist, the economist, the sociologist, the laborer in the
field and factory, in a living expression and unfolding of truth" (E. Sponga, 'The Philosophy and
Spirituality of Action," 72-73, cited in Scott, 392).

nDulles, Tradition and Crratiw'ty, 315. Dulles, 316, explains that Vatican I1 in Dei Verburn
"speaks of tradition in a subjective or active sense, to mean the process by which the apostolic
heritage is transmitted and received in the Church. . . . Unlike Trent which looked upon tradition
as invariant, Vatican I1 understands the tradition as a sense of the faith that develops organically
under the aegs of the Holy Spirit."
"See Thomas C. Oden, The Living God (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 338ff. Oden,

Tradition: Between Moriem O~ectiuismand
Postmoriem Rebtiuism

Whereas in the controversy between extrinsicism and historicism the critical
issue is related to the o r i p of knowledge and truth, in the contemporary
epistemological&vide between modernism and postmodemism it is primarily
modernism's objectification of rationality that postmodemists find
objectionable. In this sense, David Brown's rough characterization of the
modernist/pos tmodernist divide is helpful.
On the one hand we have the modernists, those who continue to support
the Enlightenment project of the pursuit of universal values and an ever
increasing human knowledge that is seen as objectively validated in shared
and secure foundations; on the other, the postmodernists, convinced that
objectivity is a will-o'-the-wisp and that therefore what can be achieved is at
most the celebration of particularism, with no overarching system of
assessment available.29

On his part, Anton A. Van Niekirk presents the epistemological contrast
between modernism and postmodernism as corresponding to metaphysical
thulkingversus postmetaphysical thinking.30Whereas the former is considered
to be substantive, the latter is procedural."
The epistemologtcal crisis that postmodernismprecipitates appears to have
one clear implication for the destiny of rationality. In the opinion of J. Wentzel
Van Huyssteen, "the critical rejection of modernist, universalist notions of
rationality will indeed imply that it is the destiny of human rationality to stay
with traditi~n."~~
It must be observed that the notion of tradition, which
338, is decidedly against any "uncritical" use of the term "tradition" that makes it mean "rigid
formulas and in-group prejudices." For Oden, tradition desires to be "danced, sung, feasted upon,
and celebrated." Its vibrant nature allows it to play a vital, dynamic role without necessarily
abandoning its enduring aspects.
29Brown,9. Brown, 32-44, later provides a more detailed characterization of postmodemism
as involving five different versions, with respect to exclusion of master narratives, no criteria for
choice, failure of local master-narrative, meaning given internally by narrative, and no reference
beyond the text.
MAntonA. Van Niekirk, "Postmetaphysical Versus Postmodem Thinking," Phihopby To&
39 (1995): 171-184.
3'Van Niekirk, 175, explains the difference between substantive and procedural thinking as
follows: "In metaphysical thinking, a fundamental assumption is that either theoretical reason will
rediscover itself in a world that is itself rationally structured, or that nature and history are rational
as a result of being structured by reason itself-whether through some type of transcendental
foundation or in the course of a dialectical permeation of the world. In contrast, postmetaphysical
thinking entails a procedural concept of rationality. . . . Rationality becomes something purely
formal insofar as the rationality of content evaporates into the validity of results. . . .The order of
things that is found in the world itself, or that has been projected by the subject, or has grown out
of the self-formative process of spirit, no longer counts as rational; instead, what counts as rational
is solving problems successfully through procedurally suitable dealing with reality. . . . Procedural
rationality can no longer guarantee an antecedent unity in the manifold of appearances."

'7.Wentzel van Huyssteen, 'Tradition and the Task ofTheology," Tkohgv T o e 5 5 (1998): 214.

replaces modernity's universalist notion, must by the nature of the case be
devoid of universahst and overarching connotation^.^^ Thus Van Huyssteen is
correct in noting that, with respect to tradition, the postmodern challenge
represents a crisis of continuity, a crisis that "now disrupts the accepted
relationship between an event and a tradition that gains its stability from that
relati~nshi~."~'
It is in the context of this dialectic between modernity's
fomdationali~m(hence universalism) and postmodernity's nonfot/ndationali.rm(i.e.,
extreme relativism) that Van Huyssteen proposes aposfo~ndationah'.rttheology, via
trahtion, to mehate the opposing position^.'^
Tradition in J. WentxeI Van Hyssteen 3
Po.s@t/ndationalistTbeolo~
The problem that Van Huyssteen's postfoundationalist theology attempts to
solve via tradition is the fragmentation of theology that has accompanied the
postmodern challenge. To the extent that postmodernity renders rationahty, as
classically understood, problematic, the credibility of theology as a rational
activity is seriously undermined. More specifically, by denying rationahty any
foundationsand malung it a social construct, postmodernitymakes a contextual
theological discourse virtually impossible. The exact effect of thls state of
affairs on Christian trahtion is to deny its very condition of possibility as a
phenomenon that embodies continuity.
It would seem that the challenge for Christian theology in the face of the
postmodern threat is to show how and in what manner the continuity of the
Chstian trahtion can be sustained intersubjectively in a nonfoundationaltst
epistemologicalmilieu. By "intersubjective" I mean specifically the transcending
of differenthistorical and cultural contexts. Van Huyssteen takes the position that
it is possible to analyze tradition in terms of its continuous and discontinuous
elements. Therefore, he argues, "What is to be rejected is any claim to a necessary,
modernist, or metaphysical continuity in history. In this sense, tradition is not
somedung that we presume as an ontological datum, but is rather something we
create out of the phenomenon of h ~ s t o r ~Van
. " ~Huyssteen
~
concurs with Delwin
Brown's theory of religious tradition, whch sees change and continuity as primary
331t would seem that the so-called "New Yale theology," in spite of its striving for
intertextuality, remains committed to a nonuniversalist notion of tradition. See Mark I. Wallace,
"The New Yale Theology," Chnitiun Scbohrs Review 17 (1988): 154-170.
"Ibid., 217.
35VanHuyssteen's approach to tradition is chosen as representative of a growing tendency
among theologians and philosophers on the question of tradition. Among these the following
especially may be noted: Brown; Alasdair MacIntyre, WhoseJustice? What Rahonalily? (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). For a discussion on Alasdair MacIntyre's approach, see
Jennifer A. Herdt, "Alasdair MacIntyre's 'Rationality of Traditions' and Tradition-Transcendental
Standards of Justification," Journal ofReLgion 78 (1998):524-546; also Jean Porter, "Openness and
Constraint: Moral Reflection as Tradition-guided Inquiry in Alisdair MacIntyre's Recent Works,"
JoumalofRehgion73 (1993): 514-536.
36VanHuyssteen, 21 8.
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categories of the dynamics of tradition and observes as follows:
This opens up a door, beyond the postmodern crisis of continuity, to doing
theology with a tradition whose continuity does not have to be guaranteed
anymore by a foundationalist metaphysics of history. In this way, we are
empowered to criticize our traditions while standing within them but are also
empowered to allow a particular history to speak for itself without being
subsumed under the umbrella of an all-encompassing theory, based on a series
of texts and interpretationswe have endowed with a particular authority, which
then functions as the accepted ideology of a specific community.37
What is tradition, bereft o f its continuous metaphysical trappings? As Van
Huyssteen develops h s postfoundationalist theory o f rationality for theology,
tradition becomes quite clearly a heuristic phenomenon, the necessary stance
o f experience from whlch we interpret the world, and with w h c h we should
embark o n an interdisciplinary conversation. Each tradition, then, essentially
uncovers a j e u ofconcems,3%nd constitutes a research paradigm.39Consequently,
from an intersubjective point o f view, traditions can only claim theoretical and
experiential adequacy without telling us anything about the truth o r falsity o f
the trad~tion.~'
I n Van Huyssteen's view:
We therefore have to accept that cognitive agreement or consensus in
theology is also, and may be especially unattainable, and that what Nicholas
Rescher called "dissensus tolerance'kould prove to be a positive and
constructive part of theological pluralism. It is at this point that we reach
beyond our specific traditions in cross-contextual conversation, to a shared
"borderlands epistemology" where the diversity of our traditions will yield
the diversity of our experiences, our contexts and situations, and our values
and methodologies.41
What Blonde1 did for the extrinsicism/historicism dialectic, Van Huyssteen
does for the modern/postmodern confhct. Van Huyssteen appears t o develop
a notion o f rationality via tradition that mediates the epistemological issues in
the conflict between modernity's foundationalism and postmodernity's
nonfoundationalism. B u t what we have is a deflated concept of tradition, at
least from the point of view o f the early church. N o t only are we denied a n
ontological datum for reflection in tradition, but, epistemologically, tradition
furnishes n o truth content as such; only theoretical and experiential adequacy.
I n dus latter regard, Blondel's approach is different from Van Huyssteen's since
the former only postulated extended development of the tncth, albeit
incomplete, in the h s t o r y o f the church's life.

"1bid. Van Huyssteen, ibid., distinguishes "the field of concerns" as that within "which both
consensus and dissent, continuity and discontinuity, acquire coherence and intelhgibility," from a
"consensus of authority."

411bid.,226; see also Nicholas Rescher, A System ofPragmalic Ideahem (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1992), 1:3-4.

MetbodohgicalImpkcations oftbe Modem and
Contemporary Concepts of Tradition
The modern concept of tradition is significantly different from the
contemporary postmodern concept by virtue of the latter's denial of an
ontological datum for reflection on tradition. From a methodological point of
view, however, both concepts have similar effects on the theological enterprise.
They both require similar thinking on the nature and goal of theology as well
as its hermeneutical and material principles.
Nature and Goal of Theology
Prior to the modem period, and among conservative evangelicals during the
modem period, the objective understanding of tradition that prevded implied a
specific understanding of the nature and goal of theology. On the basis of the
conviction that God has disclosed truth to humankind, which tradition had the
obhgation to preserve, theology conceived its task as "the discovery of the one
doctrinal system that inheres in the Bible."42In both the modem and postmodem
concepts of tradition as outlined by Blonde1 and Van Huyssteen, tmtb does not
have a clearly defined identity. In Blondel, historical development of tradition is
required for a complete formulation of the truth, whereas in Van Huyssteen the
twth is well-nigh unattainable, sincewe can only expect theoretical and experiential
adequacy.43Especially in postmodernism, the altered understanding of truth
changes the nature and goal of the theological enterprise. Stanley Grenz clearly
reflects the nature and goal of theology in the changed situation. For him theology
is a second-order enterprise that reflects a culturally conditioned language of the
confession and worldview of the community of faith.44He explains further that
"the assertion that theology speaks a second-order language is not intended to
deny the ontological nature of theological declarations. Nevertheless, the
ontologd claims implicit in theological assertions arise as an outworkingof the
intent of the theologian to provide a modelofreakiy rather than to describe reads
direct&' (emphasis mine).45The modem and postmodem concepts of tradition,
therefore, through their ambivalence over the question of truth, redefine the
nature and task of theology.
Hermeneutical Principles
The concept of revelationis central to any theological discussion on hermeneutics.
An integral component of the modem and postmodem concepts of tradition is an
increasing tendency to see tradttion as revelation. Carl Braaten spoke to this point
when he remarked as early as the mid-1960s that "the coupling of revelation with
42Grenz,Revisioning Euangekcaf Thoha, 87.
43Seealso MichaelJessup, "Truth: The First Casualty of Postrnodem Consumerism," Chtiitiian
Scholar's Review 3013 (2001): 289-304.
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history is an omnipresent feature of modem the~logy."~
The issue at stake here has to do with a changingunderstandingof the nature
of revelation. Whereas the classical view of revelation involved the revealing of
tmtbs;' which for all practical purposes were identified with the Bible,jsrevelation
in the modem and postrnodern context is increasingly understood in terms of an
ongoing divine self-disclosure. Thomas C. Oden, for example, remarks: "God
continues to reveal himself in ever-emergent human history" in a way that
"complements, extends and develops, but does not negate past disclosure^."^^ It
would seem that the subjective and dynamic conception of tradition in modem
and contemporarypostmodern theology requires a correspondrng subjective and
dynamic view of the doctrine of revelation.
The observations made so far on the question of revelation in modem and
postrnodern theology are primarily epistemological ones, yet the ontologcal
repercussions of these epistemological moves are seen in the increasing
emphasis in evangelical circles on the concept of the "openness of God" and
a growing appreciation of the process view of God." Among evangelicalswho
are inclined to the open view of God may be counted Gregory Boyd, Stephen
Franklin, Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, Willlam Hasker, and
David Basinger.'' The affmity between the open view of God and
contemporary concepts of tradition appears to rest on the similarity of their
thematic emphases. More and more, the themes of creativity, contingency, and
solidarity are emphasized as properly constitutive of an adequate concept of
tradition for our postmodern times.52These concepts, which are antithetical to
the essentialist universahsm of classical ontology in general, enjoy significant
F. Braaten, New Difections in Theobgy T o 4 (Philadelphia:Westminster, 1966), 2:16; see
also Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed., Revebtion as History (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969).
47J.

I. Packer, Fandamenta&~mand the Word of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1%8), 91.

4'H. D. McDonald, Theories ofRevebtion:A n HistoricalStudy, 1860-1960 (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1963), 161. McDonald observes: "It had been the prevailing view that revelation and the
Bible were for all practical purposes to be equated."
490den,334.
''Millard Erickson notes that one of the factors that has contributed to a challenge of the
classical doctrine of God is twentieth-century hostility toward any kind of metaphysics (The
Euangelicalbj [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997],88). It is relevant at this stage to recall the point made
earlier that the postmodern concept of tradition, especially as espoused in Van Huyssteeds
postfoundationalist theology, denies the concept any necessary ontological datum.
"See ibid., 91-107. For sdme of the works of the respective scholars mentioned above, see
Gregory Boyd, Trinity and Pmcess: A Critial Evaluation and Reconstmction ofHarfshme 5- Di-pobr Theism
Towardr a Trinitan'anMetaplyics (New York: Peter Lang, 1992); Stephen T. Franklin, Speakngfmnr
the Depths: Aynd North Whitehead's Hemeneutical Metapt?y.sics of Propositions, Experience, Symboksm,
Language, and Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990);Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice,John Sanders,
William Hasker, and David Basinger, The Openness of God A Bibha/ Chabnge to the Traditional
Understanding of Cod (Downer's Grove: InterVarsity, 1994).
"See Arthur A. Vogel, "Tradition: The Contingency Factor," in TheQaadtibg: Tradition and
the Futun OfEcumeeniism, ed. Kenneth Hagen (Collegeville,MN: Liturgical Press, 1994), 255-269; also
Dulles, "Tradition and Creativity: A Theological Approach," 313-327.

correspondence to the characteristic themes of freedom, process, and
relationships, in process theism.
Material Principles
It is customary to think about Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience as the
From a methodological point of
sources used in theologcal constr~ction.~'
view, a more important issue has to do with primacy and functional authority
among these sources. David Wells has already observed, albeit cautiously, that
contemporary theology has effectively reduced the traltional four sources to
Wells discusses the disappearance of reason as
two: Scripture and e~perience.~~
well as the assimilation of tradition into
Yet, one may speak of a
certain hermeneutical reductionism in the contemporaryconception of tradition
that functionally endows it with primacy.56
The contemporary hermeneutical insistence on the historical
conditionedness of all texts, including the Bible, would seem to give more
credibility to the total traltion of which the Bible is a part, albeit a formative
part. David Brown appears to adopt this position when in arguing for the
legitimacy of later traditions he observes of them, in connection with Christian
tradition, that they should "not only be positively enriching but actually act as
a critique of the Scriptural text."" Thus, in the end, the contemporary concept
of tradition collapses Scripture into tradition, while tradition in turn is made an
argument for experience, i.e., "the experience of the Holy Spirit w i h the
people of
Thus, the modern concept of traltion shifts the focus from
the job Scriptwa principle to the primacy of experience via tradition.

In the epistemological shlfts and turns in Christian theology since the modern
period, the concept of tradition has been used to mediate opposing viewpoints.
At each juncture, the authenticity of the Christian faith has been argued for
through a redefinition of the concept of tradition in a way that is alleged to
530nhis part, Grenz criticizes the four sources commonly understood as the quadrilateral of
sources, and in its place argues for what he call the three "pillars" or norms of theology, i.e., the
biblical message, the theological heritage of the church, and the thought-forms of the historicalcultural context in which the contemporary people of God seek to speak, live, and act (Revirioning
Enangelical Theohg, 93).
"David Wells, "The Theologian's Craft," in Doing Theolagy in Todg's World, ed. John D.
Woodbridge and Thomas E. McComiskey (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991), 175.

%ee Charles Brummett, "Recovering Pastoral Theology: The Agenda of Thomas Oden"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1990). Brummett, 281, makes this
observation of Oden's use of tradition and argues: "Pushed to its logical consequences, Oden's
methodology, or at least as he applies it, allows Scripture to collapse into tradition."
"Brown, 5.
58Wells,"The Theologians Craft," 177.
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invest the concept with its truest meaning. What seems certain, however, is that
at each transitional point the concept reflects some of the significant elements
of the philosophical orientation of the times. Thus, the concept of tradition
during the modern period was a reflection not only of Blondel's own
Similarly,
phdosophy of action, but also of Henri Bergson's idea of khn
the postmodern concept of tradition shares some of the concerns of
postmodern philosophies. For example, Van Huyssteen divests tradition of any
necessary metaphysical continuity in response to Michael Foucault's
antimetaphysical critique of Christian d~ctrine.~'
The methodological implications of these redefinitions of the concept of
tradition have been outhned above to stress the fact that these overtures,
viewed from a methodological point of view, may indicate a real change in
direction in Christian theology. Stanley Grenz confronts some of these same
methodologcal changes and calls for a revisioningof evangelicaltheology. It may
be, however, that to the extent that a change in method leads to a change in
results, a change in evangelical theological method signals not simply a
revisioning of evangelical theology, but a change in its very identity.
S9Dulles,"Tradition and Creativity," 31 8.
v a n Huyssteen, 21 6-21 8.

